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Introduction
Generally, for simplicity and transparency, intergovernmental transfers should not aim to
achieve multiple goals with a single transfer instrument but rather have separate transfers for
specific objectives. An important question is whether there should be separate transfers
specifically to finance capital expenditures. If own-source revenues—including future revenues
accessed through borrowing—are unable to provide local governments with adequate funding for
the development of capital infrastructure, then the most obvious source of financing for local
capital development is the central government budget. To the extent that the system of
intergovernmental grants is to ensure vertical fiscal balance, the adequacy of available resources
should be assessed in terms of the entire expenditure needs of subnational government functions,
including capital infrastructure. While the system of grants should balance available resources
with the entirety of capital and non-capital costs in the provision of subnational services, an
important question is whether capital needs should be financed in an earmarked manner.
There appears to be consensus in the public administration literature that capital
investments require more careful planning than non-capital projects because the consequences of
errors of omission and commission in capital investments will be felt well beyond the current
fiscal year through their impact on budgets, service provision, and economic development in the
years to come. However, once the capital project requests have been prepared according to some
rigorous planning procedures, should they be considered for funding separately from the requests
on recurrent needs?
This question of capital transfers is relatively under-addressed in the theory and practice
of intergovernmental fiscal relations. While there is a substantial literature that discusses the role
of intergovernmental fiscal transfers in general, the amount of information available on specific
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practices with respect to intergovernmental capital transfers is sparse. In this paper, we attempt to
take stock of the 80 years of theoretical and policy developments on this issue. In addition, we
provide some empirical evidence on changes in the relative importance of capital grants, and
their impact on fiscal outcomes, for a large number of countries. In particular, our empirical
analysis explores two claims often used as justification for capital grants in practice: 1) Due to
political economy reasons local government tend to underinvest relative to the level desired by
the national government. We test this claim by comparing the propensity to invest of subnational
vis-à-vis national governments. 2) The administrative and efficiency costs of earmarking grants
for capital use are justified by inducing larger investments by subnational governments. We test
this claim by comparing the propensity of local governments to invest out of capital grants
compared their propensity to invest out of general purpose grants and own resources.

Conceptual framework
Conceptually, ring-fencing of a portion of public funds for investment purposes violates
several principles of public finance management (see Gray et al, 1998, for best principles). First,
it essentially creates dual budgeting by excluding a portion of public funds from policy-based
prioritization. Second, allocation of funds by economic item (i.e., investment) shifts the focus of
budgeting away from prioritizing policy goals to merely funding inputs. While government
policies can guide the allocation of resources to sectors and priorities, investments alone cannot
be assigned any priority independent of the programs and services that utilize these capital
assets.
By artificially separating programs which aim at the same policy objective and
preventing them from competing against each other within the total resource envelope, these
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arrangements can bias budgetary allocations toward more capital intensive approaches or vice
versa. For example, traffic congestion during rush hours can be addressed through installing
intelligent traffic light controls or posting police at major intersections. A policy-based
prioritization would compare these two options along with other possible alternatives which
achieve the same policy objective and select the most efficient solution. By contrast, ring-fenced
capital budgeting would rank traffic lights installation relative to other capital projects (such as
sewer extension) but not relative to non-capital solutions to traffic congestion.1 As a result,
scarce public resources might not be channeled to problems of highest policy priority and
problems that receive funding might not be treated with the most cost-efficient treatment.
Besides creating an artificial bias in favor of capital spending (or vice versa), separation
of capital funding from financing of operating costs can lead to deferred maintenance. Budget
unity allows for the finding of an optimal level of activities needed to maintain the fixed asset at
its originally contemplated serviceability to avoid the capital costs of replacement for a longer
period of time. However, under separation of capital funding, local managers might try to save
on operating costs by not performing (deferring) maintenance at the proper time without
perceiving the incurred capital costs of this strategy. 2 Cromwell (1991) reports some empirical
evidence that intergovernmental grants can create distortions to the optimal balance between
constructing new infrastructure and maintaining the exiting stock. He finds 14 to 17 percent
more resources allocated to the maintenance of private bus fleet in the United States compared to

1

This problem can be mitigated if, in order to be considered for inclusion in the capital budget, projects have to pass
a cost-effective analysis making sure that no non-capital projects can achieve similar objectives with the same or
lower costs. Conceptually, given the high risks of errors of commission and omission inherent in capital projects, it
is always more preferable to rely on a non-capital solutions unless the latter are much costlier. In practice, it might
be the other way around as politicians will try to obscure the tax price of a project and shift the costs to the next
administration by financing it from the capital budget.
2
This goes beyond routine preventative maintenance and repairs but “also includes replacement of parts, periodic
road resurfacing and other activities needed to maintain the fixed asset at its originally contemplated serviceability
for its originally estimated life.” (Spearman 2007, p. 72)
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the maintenance of the public fleet of similar vehicles. He explains this by the fact that the Urban
Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA) pays 80 percent of regular transit vehicle
replacement while no such federal subsidies are provided for maintenance. However, this finding
is also consistent with the general argument that public managers have objectives other than cost
minimization.
Systematically deferred maintenance can add up to considerable macroeconomic effects.
When Rioja (2003) parameterized and solved numerically his macroeconomic model for a
sample of Latin American countries, quantitative results showed that reallocating funds from
new infrastructure to maintenance can have positive macroeconomic effects in those countries. A
separate macroeconomic argument in favor of unified budgeting is that for an effective
macroeconomic policy the national government needs to look at the effect of aggregate
government spending including both current and capital expenditures (Axelrod 1988).
However, in countries where higher-level governments build local infrastructure rather
than providing capital grants to local government, the distortions can be even worse. Thus, in
Germany, the states (Länder) prescribe hospital capacity levels and finance investment
expenditures but not operating costs or covering hospital losses. As a result, the state politicians
have an incentive to overbuild hospital capacity and claim political credit for employment
creation while settling local governments with the bill for operating costs, which over the years
can be multifold of the construction costs (Wurzel 1999). Thus, the inefficiencies from capital
grants are not just about the agency problem but also about the prevention of life-time costing of
facilities.

6
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This conceptual argument against capital grants have to be balanced against a number of
equally persuasive arguments for capital grants: 1) benefits of capital budgets; 2) internalization
of spillovers, and 3) fiscal equity and fairness.
Capital budgets
The practice of separate channeling of intergovernmental resources to subnational capital
expenditures might stem from the tradition of separate capital budgeting found in many
countries. Capital budgets and associated capital grants first came into existence in Sweden and
other Nordic countries in the 1930s.3 It was a strategy to promote economic recovery in the face
of prevailing opposition to financing government outlays with public borrowing in the absence
of national emergencies such as wars (Premchand 2007). In the following decades, the rationale
and application of capital budgets shifted many times: reducing the appearance of current deficits
in colonial India; vehicle of economic development under the central planning paradigm in the
late 1950s; ensuring rigorous investment appraisal and financial planning in the 1960s; and more
recently the introduction of accrual accounting in the 1990s. Thus throughout its eighty-year
history, capital budgets have been used for at least three different purposes: 1) fiscal stimulus 2)
economic development; 3) a “window to the net worth of public bodies” (Premchand 2007,
p.89).
As result of this evolution of the role of capital budgets, today this practice takes different
forms in different countries. In some countries, such as Australia, Chile and New Zealand,
separate investment budgets are used as part of accrual budgeting with depreciation allowances
charged to the current budget. Asian countries like Japan and South Korea use special budgetary
accounts which are equivalent to investment budgets. Many developing countries have
3

Reportedly in the United States first capital budgets were developed at the local level in the 1920s. Furthermore, in
1933 President Roosevelt in a federal budget separated ordinary expenditures, financed with tax receipts, from debtfinanced extraordinary expenditures necessitated by the Great Depression (Axelrod 1988).
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development budgets which accumulate foreign aid and loans but are often used for non-capital
expenditures. Finally many countries have separate accounting for capital items— either in the
framework of accrual accounting (e.g. federal budget in the United States) or under an economic
classification system — but make no distinction in the budgeting.
Originally, capital budgets came into existence to circumvent balanced budget
requirements by allowing loan financing of durable goods. But even when used for that reason, a
strong theoretical justification for excluding capital investments from the balanced budget
requirement exists only for investment into revenue-generating assets. The danger of breaking
the budget unity by separating capital expenses is that there is no guarantee that in the future
there will be a reduction in expenditure needs to offset the inherited obligations to service the
loans used to finance the construction of assets.4 The seminal discussion of this issue by
Musgrave (1939) highlights both the advantages and disadvantages of separate capital budgeting.
Given these trade-offs, international experiences with capital budgeting have been diverse but
are mostly related to compliance with borrowing constraints rather than ring-fencing of resources
for capital investments. In the United States, there is no separation between capital and operating
spending in the federal budget and budget process.5 However, more than half of US states
receive executive capital-budget requests in a separate budget without unified budget totals,
mostly to circumvent a statutory balance-budget requirement (Mikesell 1999, p. 227-28).
Rather than separation, the modern budgeting approach calls for a unified multi-year
framework incorporating operating and maintenance costs so that the distinction between capital
and non-capital projects disappears. Medium-term planning of commitments on the recurrent
4

For example, in the United States some localities are still having special property rates to pay off the bonds issued
to build schools for baby-boomers decades ago while the need for this classroom space dropped soon after the
construction was completed.
5
In the 1960s, a president’s commission investigating budget concepts rejected capital budgets as it “could lead to
greater outlays on bricks and mortar, and as a result, current outlays could suffer” (Premchand 2007, p. 91).
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side of the budget is particular important in transitional countries, where labor and civil service
legislation does not allow for easy adjustment of human resources. Under this paradigm, rather
than promoting a (dual) investment budget at the local level, the central government should
provide a general policy-driven framework for unitary planning and budgeting, which might
have special provisions for capital components of government programs. And once the central
government, in order to avoid errors of omission and commission, instills proper planning
procedures for capital components of local government programs, the central government should
focus on the objectives and outputs of those programs when allocating intergovernmental
transfers. For programs that deal exclusively with local affairs, the central government would be
mostly concerned with overall vertical and horizontal fiscal balance, which is better addressed by
general-purpose grants, possibly made conditional on adherence to national budgeting standards
including capital planning procedures.
Overall, since capital budgets were first introduced in the 1930s the argument has not
been settled about their appropriateness or even inescapability. While there might be some
conceptual justifications for their use, the “main problem with the capital budget has been that it
was never implemented in conformity with the conceptual framework, except in the first phase
of its introduction” (Premchand, 2007, p. 108). In particular charging the depreciation
allowances to the current budget, while being the core of the conceptual framework, had been
dismissed in the public sector until the recent introduction of accrual budgeting in some
countries. Furthermore, the practice of accrual and multi-year budgeting requires sophisticated
capacity in terms of human resources and IT. In particular, accrual accounting requires
sophisticated judgments about revenue projections and valuing assets that do not have any
income stream, such as museums, military installations, and so on. These high capacity
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requirements explain the fact that as of 2003 only 5 out 28 OECD countries adopted full accrual
accounting while additional 2 countries adopted modified accrual accounting without
capitalization or depreciation of assets (Boothe 2007).
Rather than for their conceptual benefits, many of which can be arguably achieved
without a separate capital budget, capital budgets are mostly used to instill more rigor of
financial planning and overall discipline in less than perfect budgetary institutions we have in
practice. In particular, in practice investment budgets mostly include infrequent irregular
expenditure outlays that require special analysis as opposed to recurrent expenditure items for
which some institutional memory and routines have been established. For that reason some longlived and expensive items that are routinely purchased by a local government (e.g. police cars)
are commonly accounted for as capital items but included in the operational budget thus
bypassing the planning rigor of the investment budget (Vogt 2007).
However, even in this more narrow practical view, different players see different virtues
of capital budgets (Premchand, 2007). For accountants and financial planners, the main utility of
capital budgets is probably facilitation of asset management. For economists, it is alignment of
the costs of infrastructure among beneficiaries and over generations of taxpayers. For politicians,
the main virtues are visibility of the expenditure outcomes and obscurity of the associated tax
price. For the private sector, the main virtues are linking government borrowing to the specific
projects and establishing the net worth of public bodies. These differences of perspectives
translate into different definitions of capital expenditures, which for example would be required
by economists to produce future benefits but for accounts it would suffice if they result in
additional assets. This discrepancy of views can explain the continued division of opinions about
capital budgets.

10
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Capital grants and externality
Conceptually, centralized capital grants can be normatively justified under two kinds of
circumstances: 1) because of the existence/compensation for spillover of benefits from capital
infrastructure across jurisdictions and 2) due to delegation of the construction of national
infrastructure projects to the localities where this infrastructure would be located. In fact, these
two justifications are related because a spillover of benefits occurs when a local government
undertakes a capital project which actually should be undertaken by a higher-level government
whose jurisdiction encompasses the entire area where the project benefits accrue. In practice,
spillover of externalities is inevitable due to less than perfect correspondence between the
varying benefit areas of the numerous types of public infrastructure and a limited number of
scales of local government to assign them to. As Hulten and Schwab (1997, p. 141) put is: "...if
each of these goods offers benefits to different subsets of the population, then logically we would
need hundreds of overlapping levels of governments."
The externality justification for capital grants is exemplified by construction of interstate
highways in the United States, which is federally planned and financed but implemented by state
governments. These special cases call for earmarking of national financing not for general capital
purposes but for specific capital projects that produce those externalities. Indeed, the central
government would not want local officials to reprioritize these funds based on local needs, which
by definition disregard spillover of benefits. Thus, there is normative justification for projectbased earmarking of capital grants in the case of externalities.6
6

The only normative case for a formula-based funding earmarked for the general purpose of capital expenditures
would stem from the central government role in economic stabilization. In this case, the central government would
want these funds to be used for absorbing unemployed labor in public works while allowing local governments to
identify projects according to local capital needs. For example, to recover from the economic recession of the early
1990s, the Canadian federal government was contributing one third of the total cost of local infrastructure projects
broadly defined. The money was allocated among provinces on the basis of population and the rate of
unemployment.
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In an example of externalities more relevant for less developed countries, for a large
portion of capital infrastructure in rural areas the benefits are not entirely local but spill over
village boundaries. Improving rural-urban linkages benefits both rural and urban populations by
facilitating access to markets by both urban and rural consumers and producers. That is, lower
transportation costs both bring cheaper foodstuffs for urban residents and reduce the costs of
inputs for agricultural producers. The presence of these spillovers calls for intergovernmental
financing in providing such infrastructure. However, under certain guidelines the administration
of these infrastructure projects can be delegated to local authorities in order to achieve efficiency
gains from utilizing their superior knowledge of local conditions.
However,

when

the

spillover

of

benefits

occurs,

conceptually

it

requires

intergovernmental financing of both construction and maintenance of such assets. This point was
eloquently made by Hulten and Schwab (1997):
Spillovers are generated by the flow of services from the stock of public capital.
We can increase that flow by either adding to the stock through investment or by
improving the stock through maintenance. If the federal government is interested
in providing the proper incentives to lower levels of government, it is hard to see
why it should encourage state and local governments to invest in new capital but
not encourage them to maintain that capital once it has been put in place.

Thus, conceptually spillover of benefits can justify earmarking of grants to infrastructure,
which should include both the construction and maintenance costs. However, if the unit costs
vary across localities, then the matching rates of Pigouvian subsidies should be inversely related
to local costs and directly related to the extent of benefit spillovers (Martinez-Vazquez et al
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2011). In practice, the estimation of the extent of externalities is not a trivial matter. For
example, no evidence of quantitatively important

spillovers from state highways on private

output is found at the regional level in the United States (Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz 1995).
Furthermore, Boarnet (1998) finds evidence of negative spillovers in California as changes in
county output are negatively associated with changes in street-and-highway capital in other
counties while being positively associated with changes in street-and-highway capital within the
same county.
By contrast, Pereira and Roca-Sagales (2003) find that the aggregate effects on private
output from public capital installed in each Spanish region are due in almost equal parts to the
direct and spillover effects. Cantos et al (2005) also find very substantial spillover effects on
regional growth associated with the capital stock of transport infrastructures in Spanish regions.
In addition, to different countries and different types of infrastructure, the different results could
be due to capturing dynamic feedbacks in the VAR approach used by Pereira and Roca-Sagales
(2003) unlike in the production function approach used by (Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz 1995) and
Boarnet (1998).
Finally, given that external benefits of local infrastructure are spread over time, just like
its direct benefits to local residents, the costs of its subsidizing should be spread across the
generations of national taxpayers accordingly. However, it would be more practical to provide a
one-time subsidy for the construction of these assets to avoid administrative costs of continuing
subsidizing these external benefits as they occur in the future. Under accrual accounting, this
upfront subsidy can be amortized in the national budget over years. In general, capital grants
subsidizing construction of local assets can be used as a practical way of subsidizing future
services produced with these assets on the basis of externalities or national policy objectives.
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(Varley, 2001). However, it will not completely eliminate the costs of future surveillance that
would be necessary to make sure that these assets are used as intended; for example ensuring that
social housing is allocated by local authorities according to the criteria envisioned by the national
government. To make these national conditions enforceable, it could be more practical to provide
national funding as a loan that will have to be paid back if local governments do not adhere to
the conditions in the future.
Capital grant and equity
One of the open conceptual questions in the design of capital grant mechanisms is
whether capital grants should address disparities in the accumulated stock of physical capital
(sometimes referred to as “capital backlog” or “capital infrastructure gap”). If the existing local
infrastructure is considered a true local good that has been built under optimal arrangements (so
that those who currently enjoy the benefits also contribute to paying off the accumulated debt),
there is no need to address this disparity with capital grants. Indeed, fiscally-induced migration
will not arise here because the incentives to migrate into infrastructure-rich jurisdictions will be
offset by the disincentives of higher taxation necessary to pay off the associated debt.
However, if the disparity in infrastructure resulted from some exogenous decision (e.g.,
discriminatory policy of the Apartheid regime in South Africa), this can cause fiscally-driven
misallocation of population. In the case of income-generating assets, this would lead to disparity
among localities in rent revenues, which has to be addressed with grants according to the fiscal
equalization theory (Boadway 2004). In case of assets that do not generate income, under accrual
accounting the income from these assets has to be imputed and accounted as expense in the
recurrent budget and as revenue in the capital budget. Thus conceptually this disparity can be
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addressed by taking into account these imputed revenues and expenditure in the assessment of
revenue capacity and expenditure needs as part of fiscal equalization.
When the infrastructure under consideration contributes to a redistributive government
function (such as basic education or primary health care), then central government intervention
might also be warranted. However, the exact form of this intervention is not necessarily clear.
Some scholars suggest that, when regional disparities are exogenously given, the central
government can also externally determine a fair or equitable distribution of physical
infrastructure and introduce a series of earmarked grants to bring about the desired allocation of
capital stock after a certain number of years (e.g., Levtchenkova and Petchey, 2004). However,
this approach is not without problems. The main rationale for decentralization is allowing local
players to make efficient decisions based on their superior knowledge of local conditions. The
right mix of capital and non-capital inputs to the production of public services is one of the most
important economic decisions. Therefore, externally imposing the level of capital infrastructure
can lead to inefficient modes of service production
In general, acquisition of assets through separate budgeting procedures leads agencies to
treat assets – once won in the struggle for a share of the government’s capital budget – as a free
good.

This can lead to inefficient utilization of the assets due to the disregarding of the

opportunity costs of the assets and also due to inefficiency in evaluating programs that utilize
these facilities without accounting for the cost of capital. If one decides to address historical bias
in the distribution of physical infrastructure, a better approach would be accounting for the
impact of infrastructure availability on the recurrent costs of service provision when equalizing
operational expenditure needs with unconditional grants. Thus, under accrual budgeting, as for
example implemented in the New Zealand model of “new public management,” a capital charge
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is levied on the net worth (as shown on its balance sheet) of each department to internalize the
amortization of public assets in the production of public services (Laking 1999). Applying this
approach to allocation of grants would impute potential capital income as part of the fiscal
capacity of those ”lucky” municipalities or alternatively assess the costs of leasing missing
infrastructure as part of expenditure needs of those less fortunate.7
To the extent that the issue of unequal capital endowment concerns fiscal equalization, it
is worth relating it to the 60 years of literature regarding efficiency-enhancing equalization
grants (see Boadway 2004 for a comprehensive review). In particular, this literature provides
some insights on how capital grants should treat differences in construction costs, differences in
borrowing, and differences in infrastructure needs in terms of large number of students and so
on.
Overall, the economic theory presents a very limited case for taking into account
differences in the costs of producing subnational public services; that limited case is entirely
based on inter-jurisdictional externalities. Concerning externalities from mobility of labor,
equalization grants should take into account local costs only to the extent of publicness of local
government services as private benefits of the local services are fully internalized in the
individual’s migration decision. However, most empirical estimates of the congestion parameter
for local government services imply these are highly congestible (Albouy 2010). Given the
empirically found privateness of local government services, there is little need for
intergovernmental grants to take into account local costs from that perspective.
On the other hand, the theoretical justification for intergovernmental grants as a
compensation for inter-jurisdictional spillover of benefits from local government services
7

The potential capital income is quite real as exemplified by the fact that the fortunate half of Macedonia’s
municipalities that inherited high schools buildings finance two thirds of non-labor costs in secondary education
through facility-generated income, such as renting out school gyms for fitness classes (Feruglio et al 2008).
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requires such Pigouvian subsidies to be inversely related to local costs of government services.
The only possible case for efficiency-inducing equalization grants to be positively related to
local capital needs is due to differences in the composition of population in terms of entitlement
to various capital-intensive services. However, this conjecture articulated by Boadway (2004)
has not been formally derived in the theoretical literature.
On the revenue side, efficiency-inducing equalization grants should take into account
disparities in source-based taxes and local rents. Concerning disparities in residence-based taxes,
only those disparities should be equalized that are determined by the differences in the
composition of residents in those jurisdictions in terms of income-earning abilities but not their
actual income as for example determined by local income-generating opportunities. These
normative prescriptions for fiscal equalizations were derived using a single-period model.
Conceptually these arguments could be extended to a multi-period setting so that a migration
decision by a local resident is determined by the present value of future revenues and costs.
However, this introduces one additional aspect of disparities namely the cost of inter-temporal
smoothing or borrowing costs (Herrero-Alcalde et al. 2011). Thus, for two jurisdictions with
identical streams of future revenues, the one with higher borrowing cost will have a lower
present value of its revenues.
It is important to realize that within any country, with its own peculiar financing
institutions, the ability to borrow is likely to differ markedly across sub-national governments.
Local government borrowing from competitive capital markets –either through private financial
institutions or directly from the bond markets- requires the local authority to be creditworthy by
demonstrating its financial ability to repay its loan over time and technical capacity to manage its
debt. As such, the very nature of capital markets assures that local government borrowing is
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likely to exacerbate horizontal imbalances: credit markets provide larger and wealthier regional
and local governments with access to capital funding, while smaller and poorer local
governments are typically excluded altogether from access to capital.
However, the issue of inadequate fiscal capacity of poorer jurisdictions is not specific for
debt financing. Without being addressed with effective remedies, it affects the ability of local
governments to finance their operating costs just the same way as their ability to repay debt. In
fact, debt financing is only a tool for managing the flow of income and expenditures across time
periods. If the flow of income is overall inadequate to finance the flow of expenditures rather
than being mismatched across time, then debt financing cannot improve this situation. However,
when a decentralized fiscal system is able to effectively address fiscal disparities by equalizing
fiscal capacity and expenditure needs, including capital costs, this equalization will allow local
governments to generate current surplus necessary to service their debt. Stable and predictable
intergovernmental equalization and other grants contribute significantly to building the
creditworthiness of local governments, if not just the same way as stable revenues from their
own sources. An example is provided by the practice of intercepting sub-national government
sources of revenues; the ability to intercept intergovernmental transfers can be seen by creditors
as the most secure collateral.8
There is however one related issue that is specific to debt financing. Even when being
able to generate revenue surpluses from their own sources and stable intergovernmental
transfers, smaller jurisdictions might not be served by private markets because of the small size
of their financial needs and relatively higher associated transactions costs. This suggests that
policy makers need to consider alternative means of funding capital infrastructure in local
8

At the same time the right to intercept intergovernmental transfers can discourage lenders’ effort to monitor local
government finances, and in some cases could be interpreted by these lenders as a promise of central government
bailout. For example, Mexico has recently abandoned the practice of the intercept for these same reasons.
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authorities that lack access to capital markets. Capital grants are only one of several alternatives
to private sector borrowing for financing local capital development in smaller jurisdictions, as we
discuss immediately below.
Intermediary financial institutions specializing in local governments can help break the
vicious circle in which smaller less-developed localities are restricted in funding infrastructure
investments because of lack in capacity to manage borrowing. Although international practices
vary substantially between countries, an intermediary institution can borrow in its own name and
use the proceeds to purchase debt instruments of local governments; this type of intermediary is
known as a bond bank. Alternatively, financial intermediaries that serve local governments might
assemble and repackage municipal debt instruments and make them available to the market (e.g.,
create local bond pools). Such intermediaries can provide access to capital markets for smaller
governments that otherwise would not get credit. Moreover, intermediation brings savings on the
fixed costs of debt issuance thanks to standardized borrowing procedures and documentation,
and technical assistance to local governments with capital planning, cash flow projections, and
pre-structuring of loan packages (Freire and Petersen, 2004). While this intermediation is
provided for a price, the fees associated with such intermediation for small-scale projects are
generally less than the costs of bond issuance. In the United States, bond banks have been quite
successful in leveraging “economies of scale on behalf of the small borrowers” since 1960s
(Government Finance Group 1997, p. 29).
In practice, financial intermediation, especially when run by the national government, can
have its own problems. Besides creating moral hazards, if the “soft” financial assistance from the
center is institutionalized, it can also create a culture of long-term dependency and impede
capital market development. Therefore, as a practical compromise, complementing borrowing
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with equalizing capital grants would allow the grants component to be means tested, thus
representing an upfront payment of future gaps between debt service costs and revenue
collections at some reasonable rates. Such upfront grants can be superior to subsidized interest
rates and operating subsidies as they bring transparency and eliminate the need for future
surveillance and administration (Varley 2001). The allocation of grants can be based on
affordability analyses, targeting those projects that would become affordable only if subsidized
with a partial grant.
Petchey and MacDonald (2007) argue that capital grants can be used as a “short-term
option” in transition and developing countries until subnational governments get access to capital
markets, tax handles or predictable intergovernmental revenue. Furthermore, they argue that
under the aforementioned constrains, capital grants can be used as a short-cut for ensuring equal
access to public services that have capital as the main input (e.g., transport). While this might be
a valid point in some specific settings, it is not uncommon in developing countries to see local
governments not having cash to provide access to education even at a “school under a tree” at the
backdrop of aborted government construction sites and idle pieces of infrastructure, which were
found to be of little use upon completion. For a broad range of public services allowing some
degree of substitution between capital and non-capital inputs, the flexibility of, for example a
sectoral block grant, would significantly enhance the chances of local governments to provide a
larger access to these services than conditional grants earmarked to capital use or specific
infrastructure projects.
In summary, normative theory gives some guidance for the use of capital grants and
limits it to the cases of benefit spillovers, outsourcing of national projects, credit enhancement,
and, in some circumstances, addressing historical disparities in the existing stock of
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infrastructure that are not the product of specific choices made by local governments themselves.
These normative prescriptions are summarized in Table 1. For capital inputs to the provision of
truly local public services, the theory suggests importance of unitary planning and budgeting
possibly relying on inter-temporal financing through savings from past revenues and borrowing
against future revenues.

Capital grants in practice
Overall trends
In practice, capital grants are used beyond the aforementioned theoretically justified
causes (see Box 1). Out of 151 countries included in the 2010 edition of the IMF Government
Finance Statistics, 96 countries report non-missing values for intergovernmental capital grants in
at least one of the years from 1990-2008. One simple general reason for such a wide-spread use
of capital grants is that real-world decentralized systems of government do not always follow the
ideal model of decentralized public finance. As we pointed out earlier, lack of taxing powers
affects the ability of local governments to finance their capital investments just the same as their
ability to finance their operating costs.
Another powerful reason for the prevalence of capital grants is that central governments
tend to treat capital development in a more centralized manner than recurrent programs. In cases
where the provision of given services may have been devolved to local governments, it is not
untypical to find central governments maintaining significant control over capital infrastructure
decisions. This is despite the fact, that typically the share of subnational governments in capital
expenditures of a country is twice their share of recurrent expenditures (Figure 1). This is true for
countries in each income group and for the world average of the subnational share of capital
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expenditures, which is 60 percent compared to the 30 present of recurrent expenditures
accounted for by subnational government.
Box 1 International Practices and Best Practices in the Design of Capital Transfers
International experience with the design of capital transfers shows that a large variety of
approaches are used. Most countries use some form of capital transfers in support of subnational
governments for specific sectoral expenditure areas such as roads, water and sewerage treatment
plants, transportation, housing, education, health, and so on. Regarding the mechanism used to
allocate capital transfers, country experiences vary from ad hoc allocation decisions to formalized
approaches using pre-established formulae. Similarly, country experiences vary in flexibility from
the least flexible “project-based grants” to unconstrained funds provided as part of a general
revenue transfer. Often the amount of capital grants has to be matched with locally raised resources
and the matching rate is sometimes inversely related to the local income (e.g. Finland)
The lack of information and the variety of approaches observed make it particularly
difficult to generalize and extract lessons useful for just any country trying to establish or reform a
system of capital transfers. At the risk of oversimplification, one can say that the typical country
has a variety of capital transfers which are closed-funded in the national budget, have earmarked
funds within specific capital expenditure categories, require some level of matching funds from
subnational governments, and whose funds are allocated either by an objective formula or on a
specific project basis. The variety of specific details in the design of capital transfers is a reflection
of the many institutional features associated with capital transfers and the multitude of objectives
that may be pursued by governments in this area. The range of objectives for capital transfers
include: closing disparities in local infrastructure endowments, subsidizing capital projects with
cross-jurisdictional spillovers of benefits, addressing vertical imbalance in the assignment of
revenue sources, addressing lack of credit availability, and others.
Source: Martinez-Vazquez (2000).
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Even in such a highly decentralized country as the United States, for state and local
infrastructure projects accepted for federal co-financing, the federal contribution has varied
between 30 and 55 percent in contrast to its share of maintenance costs of public infrastructure,
which never reached above 4.5 percent (Hulten and Schwab 1997).9 At the same time,
throughout the 1956-1989 period, own revenues of state and local governments financed the bulk
(68 percent) of public infrastructure construction in the United States while the federal grants
accounted only for 18 percent with the remaining 14 percent accounted for by direct federal
expenditures.
Similar to the case of foreign aid to developing countries, it is the higher visibility of
infrastructure construction that biases intergovernmental grants towards capital earmarking so
that for a legislative representative it would be easier to claim credit for new infrastructure built
in his electoral district (Lee et al 2003). While most of the theoretical rationales for capital grants
require project specific allocation as opposed to block grants, in practice such mechanism of
grant allocation is also more susceptible to log-rolling than a formula-based allocation.
According to the IMF GFS data, on average, twenty percent of intergovernmental grants
in the world is earmarked for capital use (Figure 2). This earmarked share is the lowest in OECD
countries (13 percent) and the highest in upper-middle income countries (40 percent). From
juxtaposing Figures 1 and 2, it is interesting to note that OECD countries are the most
decentralized in terms of capital expenditures but at the same time use the least earmarking of
intergovernmental grants for capital use. Similarly, a qualitative survey of governments revealed
that three in five developed countries earmark transfers for capital use as opposed to four in five
transitional countries, which can be explained by the legacy of central planning (OECD/World

9

Here, the notion of ‘core infrastructure’ includes capital assets in such sectors as highways, mass transit, rail,
aviation, water transport, water resources, water supply and sewage treatment.
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Bank 2003). In transition countries, capital transfers are often channeled through a plethora of
extra-budgetary funds created within various line ministries (e.g., Romania until 2004).
Although potentially an inefficient budgetary practice, development budgets are still
found in some (mostly developing) countries not only due to historical inertia but also because of
external reasons. Donors prefer separation of the development budget from the regular budget
because it is easier to monitor progress on investment projects than on general government
programs. In addition, donors might prefer capital projects because of the misconception that
capital expenditures are always more productive for development than current expenditures. By
contrast, for grant allocation to its own members and prospective candidates, the EU requires
each country to develop a single programming document, which shows how government
priorities determine eligible projects, capital in nature or not, for example retraining of labor
force.
In transitional countries, the practice of capital grants takes its genesis from the ad hoc
delineation of responsibilities and resources during the first years of transition (on top of the long
tradition of central planning). Because central governments were sensitive to political costs of
wage arrears in schools and hospitals, they wanted local authorities to pay salaries first under the
pretext that resources for capital expenses would be coming separately. Nevertheless, throughout
the transitional countries, capital grants have played a smaller role in financing of local
infrastructure than own revenue of local governments (often from the sale of assets) and
borrowing, with the latter being more prevalent in Central Europe (Swianiewicz 2004).
Throughout the world, capital grants account for about one third of net subnational investments
and this share ranges from less than one-fifth in lower-middle counties to over a half in OECD
countries (Figure 3).
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All in all, across the world, subnational governments account for almost two thirds of
public investments, only one third of which is financed with capital grants, which in turn
accounts for one-fifth of intergovernmental transfers. It should be noted however that, while the
lowest share of grants (15 percent) is earmarked for capital use in the OECD countries, it
accounts for the largest share of subnational investments (one-half) as capital expenditures play a
much smaller role in the budgets of developed countries compared to the world average.
Empirical hypotheses and estimation strategy
Our empirical analysis explores two claims often used as justification for capital grants in
practice. First, it is often claimed that, due to political economy reasons, local governments tend
to underinvest relative to the level desired by the national government. Thus, Ahmad and Searle
(2006, p. 389) argue that separating recurrent transfers from capital transfers could be
appropriate in many low- and middle-income countries where "scarcity of financial resources
and popular pressure to use them for immediate current spending may leave little for capital
formation." Similarly, according to Boothe (2007, p. 192): "one of the key reasons for
advocating a move to accrual accounting has been the view that during periods of deficit
reduction, governments using cash accounting simply replace fiscal deficits with infrastructure
deficits by ignoring the depreciation of public capital." Moak and Hillhouse (1975) suggest that,
when under fiscal strain, local governments tend to postpone capital projects rather than
expenditures for operating agencies. Similar evidence from surveys of coping strategies of U.S.
cities was reported by Pagano (1993). We test this claim by comparing the propensity to invest
of subnational vis-à-vis national governments.
Second, the administrative and efficiency costs of earmarking grants for capital use are
often justified by the expected effect of inducing subnational governments to make additional
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investments into public infrastructure. We test this claim by comparing the propensity of local
governments to invest out of capital grants compared to their propensity to invest out of general
purpose grants and own resources.
The propensity of central and subnational governments to invest is modeled with crosssectional and panel-data regressions, while controlling for other determinants of public
investments. In the appendix, we provide the complete list of explanatory variables that we
considered in our regressions along with their definitions and sources of data.
We use two alternative empirical strategies: the between estimation explores propensity
to invest in a cross-country analysis while the within estimation analyzes changes over time.
Conceptually we cannot favor one specification over the other. The within estimation discards
information on cross-country variation by country-demeaning (differencing from the country
average over time) all variables. On the other hand without demeaning, we cannot control for
some unobservable factors specific to each country. If these factors are correlated with some of
the included regressors, then we are likely to obtain biased estimates using the between
estimator.
Another econometric issue is a possible bias from endogeneity of capital earmarking.
Indeed, in countries where subnational governments have lower propensity to invest, the national
governments might do more earmarking of grants. The best response to this problem is a set of
valid instruments – that is, variables that affect subnational investments only through their effect
on capital earmarking of grants. Unfortunately, it is hard to identify variables that would be
good instruments for the capital earmarking of grants. It is our hope that this potential
endogeneity is partially mitigated in our panel data by including fixed country effects.
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Estimation Results
First, we report the estimates of the propensity to invest by subnational governments. In
the first column of Table 2 we report the results of the “between estimation,” based on the time
averages of the longitudinal observations for different countries in our sample. All fiscal
variables are normalized by total government revenues in a particular country. The included
variables jointly explain about three fourth of cross-country variation in subnational investments.
The subnational propensity to invest out of capital grants is estimated to be 0.69 with the 95percent confidence interval between 0.24 and 1.13. At the same time the subnational propensity
to invest out of own revenue is estimated to be 0.13 with the 95-percent confidence interval
between 0.06 and 0.19.
We can reject at the 1% significance level the hypothesis that the subnational propensity
to invest out of capital grants is not higher than the propensity to invest out of own revenues (or
recurrent grants for that matter). At the same time, the propensity to invest out of own revenues
is statistically indistinguishable from the propensity to invest out of recurrent grants even at the
10% significance level. However, we can reject full additionality (that is the propensity to invest
our of capital grants of no less than 1) only at the 8% significance level.
In the last two columns of Table 2 we report the results of the panel data analysis. In the
second column we report the results of the fixed effects estimation based on the deviation from
time averages for different countries in our sample. The included variables jointly explain about
a quarter of the within variation in subnational investments. This approach should yield
consistent but potentially less efficient estimates than the random effects model reported in the
last column of the table. As the Hausman test does not find any systematic differences between
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the two panel data models, we will focus on the random effects model, which is expected to
provide more accurate statistical inferences in the absence of consistency problems.
According to the random effects model, the subnational propensity to invest out of capital
grants is estimated to be 0.62 with the 95-percent confidence interval between 0.42 and 0.81. At
the same time the subnational propensity to invest out of own revenue is estimated to be 0.08
with the 95-percent confidence interval between 0.05 and 0.11.
We can reject at the 1% significance level the hypothesis that the subnational propensity
to invest out of capital grants is not higher than the propensity to invest out of own revenues (or
recurrent grants for that matter). At the same time, the propensity to invest out of own revenues
is statistically indistinguishable from the propensity to invest out of recurrent grants even at the
10% significance level. However, we can reject full additionality (that is the propensity to invest
our of capital grants of no less than 1) at the 1% significance level.
Finally, we report the estimates of the propensity to invest by the central government.
The purpose is to determine whether subnational governments tend to underinvest compared to
the level desired by the national government. The propensity of the national government to
invest can be defined in two alternative ways: relative to the own revenue of the national
government and relative to the national expenditures other than grants. The estimates of the two
alternative definitions of the propensity to invest are reported in tables 3 and 4 respectively. It
appears that the propensity of local governments to invest out of own resources is considerably
lower than propensity of the national government to invest, defined in two different ways.
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Conclusions
While in many developing and transitional countries some part of resources for local
capital development has to come from the central government, conceptually it does not have to
be through a transfer scheme separate from that for financing operational expenses. In theory,
when the system of intergovernmental grants addresses fiscal disparities by achieving vertical
and horizontal fiscal balance, this balance should allow local governments to generate current
surplus necessary to service the debt required to finance capital investments. Furthermore, stable
and predictable intergovernmental grants contribute to building the creditworthiness of local
governments similarly to stable revenue streams from their own sources.
The existence of capital budgets and capital grants in practice is mostly justified by the
departure of the real-life settings from the ideal model of fiscal decentralization due to political economy and institutional issues. Therefore, capital grants should not be analyzed with the ideal
model but instead using a model featuring all those real-life issues. In this paper we attempt to
undertake such positive analysis.
The IMF’s GFS data show that typically the share of subnational governments in capital
expenditures of a country is twice their share of recurrent expenditures. We find that most of
public infrastructure in a typical country (possibly with the exception of low-income countries
for which data are scarce) is built by subnational governments using their own or generalpurpose grant revenues. However, the small fraction of public infrastructure projects that are (co) financed by the national governments are subject to various strings attached.
We use the IMF’ GFS data to examine the effect of capital grants on subnational
government investments. Various estimators produce qualitatively similar results. As a midrange estimate we can quote the results from the random effects estimator, which is known to be
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arithmetically equivalent to a weighted average of the between- and fixed-effect estimators.
According to the random effects model, the subnational propensity to invest out of capital grants
is estimated to be 0.62 with the 95-percent confidence interval between 0.42 and 0.81. Thus,
each additional dollar of capital grants is associated with between 42 and 81 additional cents of
subnational investments. At any conventional level of statistical significance, we can reject full
additionality, that is the propensity to invest our of capital grants of no less than 1. Given this
leakage, the administrative and efficiency costs of earmarking grants for capital use have to be
balanced against their limited effect on investments by subnational governments.
If financing of capital costs is done separately for some, possibly external reason, then it
should follow the same principles of intergovernmental fiscal transfers to prevent further
efficiency losses. In particular, a formula-based capital development grant system could provide
financial resources to local governments (those with greater infrastructure needs and less own
resources) in order to assure a more equitable (pro-poor) development of capital infrastructure.
Because of the transparency and predictability of a formula-based capital development grant
system, local governments would be able to engage more easily in strategic planning of their
development activities.
In many transitional countries, road funds represent a legitimate example of such
transparent and predictable allocation. Fuel excises are collected nationally for administrative
expediency but redistributed—ideally based on a formula, as for example in Latvia— among
localities and earmarked for local roads (both construction and maintenance). In this case,
intergovernmental redistribution is normatively justified by inter-jurisdictional externalities
while excise-financing brings elements of benefit taxation by creating a link to road use. Under
another example of formula-based capital grants, in the United Kingdom, the national target of
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delivering adequate-quality social housing is achieved through earmarked grants to local
authorities based on a formula capturing the condition and rehabilitation costs of existing
housing stock and demand for additional housing capacity (Petchey, Jeffrey and Garry
MacDonald 2007)
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Table 1. Optimal design of intergovernmental financing of local capital needs
Objective

Revenue sharing/Adequacy

Fiscal equity

Spillovers or
“externalities”

“Merit goods”

General
purpose vs.
capital grants

Capital needs taken into account in
the allocation of general purpose
grants; capital earmarking under the
centralization of borrowing capacity

Capital needs taken into
account in the allocation of
general purpose grants

Earmarked for
the externalitygenerating
activities

Earmarked for the
merit goods

Global vs.
sectorearmarked

Global

A trade-off between formula
simplicity (perception of
fairness) and accuracy of
capturing disparities in capital
needs

Sectorearmarked

Sector-earmarked

Need
adjustment

Only with respect to economic
infrastructure; Alternatively can be
addressed through separate
conditional/matching grants since
local economic infrastructure
produce vertical externalities by
increasing the yield of
national/shared taxes in the locality

Differences in the proportion of
population groups entitled to
capital-intensive local services;
in case of inequitable
distribution of existing
infrastructure, imputed capital
income is subtracted from
expenditure needs

None

Differences in the
proportion of
population groups
entitled to merit
goods

Cost
adjustment

Only proportional to the extent of
vertical fiscal externalities. As with
other conditional grants, the optimal
matching rate can be inversely
related to the local cost level.

For economic efficiency, cost
adjustment only if local
services are not fully
congestible (fully private); For
social equity, full equalization
of costs

Inverse relation
to the costs

Full equalization;
bottom-up costing in
the case of an assured
universal minimum

Grant design
choice
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Table 2. Determinants of subnational investments
Between
Panel Estimation
Estimation
Fixed
Random
country
country
effect
effects
Capital grants
0.686***
0.582***
0.616***
(0.222)
(0.128)
(0.053)
Recurrent grants
0.041
0.030
0.039**
(0.050)
(0.033)
(0.016)
Own revenue
0.126***
0.047
0.081***
(0.032)
(0.040)
(0.016)
GDP per capita
-0.195
-0.513
-0.557***
(0.336)
(0.659)
(0.197)
Financial market
-0.006
-0.007***
-0.007***
capitalization
(0.010)
(0.002)
(0.002)
Roads paved
0.005
0.030***
0.018***
(0.014)
(0.008)
(0.006)
Population growth
0.008*
0.004
0.004***
(0.005)
(0.003)
(0.001)

N [countries]
R2
Housman test (p-value)

536 [62]

536 [62]

536 [62]

0.74

0.28

—
0.79

Notes: Fiscal variables are normalized by general government revenues. Year
dummies included in all specifications. Cluster robust standard errors are in
parentheses.
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Table 3. Determinants of central government investments
Between
Panel Estimation
Estimation
Fixed
Random
country
country
effect
effects
Own revenue
0.303***
0.054
0.121***
(0.079)
(0.076)
(0.040)
GDP per capita
-2.920***
-1.830
-2.320***
(0.799)
(1.250)
(0.501)
Financial market
0.201
-0.145*
-0.126***
capitalization
(0.229)
(0.079)
(0.044)
Roads paved
0.005
0.048
0.031*
(0.032)
(0.047)
(0.016)
Population growth
0.010
0.008
0.011***
(0.011)
(0.008)
(0.003)

N [countries]
R2
Housman test (p-value)

536 [62]

536 [62]

536 [62]

0.64

0.257

—
Negative
Chi2

Notes: Fiscal variables are normalized by general government revenues. Year
dummies included in all specifications. Cluster robust standard errors are in
parentheses.
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Table 4. Determinants of central government investments
Between
Panel Estimation
Estimation
Fixed
Random
country
country
effect
effects
Central government
0.239***
0.071*
0.099***
expenditures
(0.064)
(0.039)
(0.026)
GDP per capita
-3.010***
-1.970
-2.321***
(0.806)
(1.25)
(0.501)
Financial market
0.227
-0.158*
-0.146***
capitalization
(0.236)
(0.082)
(0.044)
Roads paved
0.010
0.047
0.032*
(0.032)
(0.047)
(0.016)
Population growth
0.011
0.008
0.011***
(0.011)
(0.008)
(0.003)

N [countries]
R2
Housman test (p-value)

536 [62]

536 [62]

536 [62]

0.64

0.28

—
0.78

Notes: Fiscal variables are normalized by general government revenues. Year
dummies included in all specifications. Cluster robust standard errors are in
parentheses.
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Figure 1. Decentralization of recurrent and capital expenditures, 1997-2008
Capital

Recurrent

Source: Prepared by authors based on data reported in IMF (2010)
Notes: The sample includes 39 countries, out of which 6 lower middle income, 10 upper middle income, 2 non-OECD high income, and 21 OECD countries.

35

36

International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series

Figure 2. Capital grants as a share of total grants, 1993-2008

Source: Prepared by authors based on data reported in IMF (2010)
Notes: The sample includes 44 countries, out of which 1 low income, 9 lower middle income, 9 upper middle
income, 3 non-OECD high income, and 22 OECD countries.
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Figure 3. Capital grants as a share of subnational capital investments, 1997-2008

Source: Prepared by authors based on data reported in IMF (2010)
Notes: The sample includes 33 countries, out of which 1 low income, 7 lower middle income, 7 upper middle
income, 2 non-OECD high income, and 16 OECD countries.
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Data appendix
This appendix describes construction of our variables.
The fiscal variables are obtained from the IMF’s 2010 Government Finance Statistics
Yearbook (GFS), which reports revenue and expenditures in the GFSM 2001 framework for the
period of 1990–2008.
We use the following formulae to calculate the fiscal variables respectively:
Gross subnational revenue (SGLG_1) = State revenue (SG_1) + Local revenue (LG_1)
Total govt revenue= Gross central revenue (CG_1) +Gross subnational revenue
(SGLG_1) – grants given by subnational govts (SGLG_263) – grants given by central
govt (CGx_263)
Subnational own revenue = Gross subnational revenue (SGLG_1) – grants received by
subnational govts from other levels of govt (SGLG_133)
Current grants given by central govt (CG_2631)
Capital grants given by central govt (CG_2632)
Net acquisition of nonfinancial assets by central govt (CG_31)
Subnational investments = Net acquisition of nonfinancial assets by states (SG_31)–Net
acquisition of nonfinancial assets by local govts (LG_31).
In the formulae, the code in parentheses refers to the corresponding GFS time series. For
example, CG_1 refers to the time series with the GFS classification Code “1” for the
consolidated central government sector. Where data for the consolidated central government
sector were missing, we used instead the sum of corresponding time series for the Budget
Accounts (BA) and Extra-budgetary Accounts (EA), for example BA_1+EA_1 in place of CG_1.
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We combine data reported on cash and accrual basis and use whichever is available in a given
year. Non-fiscal data derive from the World Development Indicators Online:

GDP per capita

Real GDP per capita is in constant 2000 international
dollars. Data was reported adjusted by the Purchasing
Power Parity index.

Financial market
capitalization

Value of stocks traded was used to proxy for the level
of financial infrastructure development. Variable was
measured as a percentage of GDP.

Roads paved

Roads paved were used to proxy for existing level of
capital infrastructure. Variable was measured as a
percentage of total roads.

Population growth

Population growth is measured as an annual percentage
and is a proxy for the future need of capital
infrastructure.
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